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Abstract
Suiza Foods has rapidly grown to become the largest company in the U.S. ﬂuid milk industry. This
teaching case is designed to familiarize students with the challenges which confront Suiza in its quest
for further growth and, in turn, high proﬁtability. Interviews with top executives describe the history
of Suiza as well as the rationale behind Suiza’s strategies. Information is presented on both economic
and ﬁnancial trends so as to allow the student to assess Suiza’s past, present and future performance.
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1. Introduction
From its founding in late 1993, Suiza Foods has grown to be the nation’s largest ﬂuid milk
bottler in only seven years. This case is the story about how such rapid growth has been
achieved. It is designed to help students understand both the forces propelling Suiza forward
as well as the challenges which lie ahead for Suiza and the bottled milk industry as a whole.
The ﬂuid milk business is characterized by declining per capita demand. As shown in
Exhibit 1, competing beverages such as carbonated soft drinks and bottled water are gaining
market share at the expense of ﬂuid milk. Milk Industry Magazine editor Barbara Martin
knew that growing a ﬂuid milk business was difﬁcult. Thus the ﬁrst question she asked Mr.
Gregg Engles, Chairman of the Board of $6 billion Suiza Foods Corporation, concerned the
challenge of maintaining up-to-date plant and equipment. Mr. Engles responded, “Running
a business is not about next quarter’s results. Our managers know you have to invest back
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facilities and new equipment.”
Barbara next asked Gregg about the toughest challenge facing Suiza. Gregg responded,
“At the start, time itself was our toughest challenge. Once you get an acquisition started, you
cannot slow down. Further, we knew we had to keep moving quickly to obtain sustainable
advantage. Now we have nearly ninety processing facilities. Our strategy is to modernize the
best plants and close the inefﬁcient plants.”
Changing the subject to an always difﬁcult area, Barbara asked Gregg about people
management. He responded with the following complex and insightful answer. “In our case
we need the best people in management positions to be sure they do not make things more
complicated than they need to be. We need managers who stick to our fundamental business
model. This is to adequately manage the business while consolidating with speed. We must
manage our really rapid growth well so that the stock market maintains conﬁdence in us. So
we made a very early decision that good company management required a very decentralized
model. This means we have some inconsistency now. That is ok because we want to win the
consolidation battle. You cannot do both at the same time with the [low] margin structure we
have in dairy.”
2. Fluid milk bottling history
The concept of a nationwide ﬂuid milk company is not new. Both branded and private
label companies have done business on a nationwide basis. Two examples of successful
private label companies would include the bottling businesses of The Kroger Company and
of Safeway Inc. Both sell almost all of their milk production through their respective retail
outlets. As such the driver of success comes largely from cost minimization in the production
and delivery of products to retail. In this vertically integrated structure, the bottling operation
is totally dependent upon the success of the retail operation. Thus when Safeway experienced
its 1986 restructuring and withdrew from several retail markets, dairy operations were
reduced substantially as a result.
Other multiregional milk bottling companies such as Borden, Carnation, Foremost and
Knudsen have historically existed totally apart from any retail ownership. This type of
business structure is quite different from the private label approach. First, because shelf space
Exhibit 1







Fruit juice All alcohol
(gal./person) (gal./person) (gal./person) (gal./person) (gal./person)
1977 29.0 1.3 33.0 6.5 26.1
1987 26.3 5.7 41.9 7.9 28.0
1997 24.0 13.1 53.0 9.2 25.2
* Source: Putnam and Allhouse (1999).
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Second, this substantially expands the varieties and types of dairy products manufactured and
in turn raises operating costs. Third, nonretail customers such as schools, restaurants, and
home delivery play an important role.
Borden was the largest of these independent bottlers. Not satisﬁed with the pace of growth
in the ﬂuid milk business, Borden diversiﬁed into the chemicals business plus a wide array
of other nondairy food businesses. The diversiﬁcation strategy pursued was to purchase small
regional food brands and grow them into national brands. This strategy resulted in the
purchase of almost 80 different food companies. However, Borden was unable to grow this
wide array of businesses against dominant ﬁrms in each category. For example, Frito Lay in
the salty snack business and Kraft in the cheese business proved to be too strong. Eventually
KKR purchased Borden and sold the Borden dairy businesses (Deveny & Hwang, 1994).
Southland Corporation’s dairy operations, which hold an historic tie to the present day
Suiza Foods, existed as a hybrid of both the private label and the brand approach. Southland
entered the dairy processing and convenience store business almost by accident. The
company began with the ice business before widespread home refrigeration. A natural
opportunity led Southland to begin selling milk and other perishable items out of its ice
houses. Also they began home delivery of milk with their ice. This early combination
eventually led to both the creation of the 7-Eleven convenience stores and to a milk bottling
business. With Southland’s own 7-Eleven Stores serving as a primary sales outlet, this
bottling business had the advantage of a large captive sales base totaling over 7,000 domestic
convenience stores. The widespread locations of these stores placed “small stop” dairy
delivery trucks in many geographies, thus creating a competitive advantage in making
additional deliveries to other smaller dairy customers such as restaurants, schools, and other
food service accounts.
3. The Suiza story
Barbara was also able to interview Tex Beshears, a former member of the Suiza Board of
Directors. Tex came from the Southland Corporation where he managed 28 milk plants. Tex
gladly explained his background. “When I started in 1980, our wholesale milk sales were
$400 million. By the time I stepped down in 1988, our sales were $800 million. I took a
company 70% dependent on 7-Eleven store volume and grew it to the point where it was only
30% dependent on 7-Eleven store volume. This size put our dairy processing volume below
that of Borden, Carnation, Knudsen and Foremost. However we were still in the top ten
among U.S. ﬁrms.”
When combined with his down to earth personality, this size put Tex in the position to
hold national ofﬁce at the Milk Industry Foundation, an industry trade association. When
Southland did a management-led leveraged buyout, the support processing operations were
spun off, leaving Tex without a job. He poured all his energies into his Vice Chairmanship
and later Chairman position at MIF. The national travel and relations with the nation’s top
dairy ﬁrm owners gave him a network which was to become crucial to the birth and growth
of Suiza Foods.
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Engles. Engles relates that early meeting and the birth of Suiza as follows. “Tex had a simple
concept. It was to gain market share through acquisitions in the ice and milk processing
industry, then use this share to gain savings from economies of scale. The idea was simple
and, if you look at other food industries such as soft drinks, cookies, soup, and meat, you
cannot deny its success. We did have to move quickly to obtain sustainable advantage, to get
big and grow.”
According to Tex, “When we made our ﬁrst offer for Suiza Dairy in Puerto Rico, it was
rejected due to a higher competing bid from dairy giant Dean Foods. However, a year later
the owners of Suiza came back to us. Their deal with Dean had fallen through due to a
disagreement over price. We moved quickly to acquire Suiza. Today it is still one of our top
performing divisions and Hector Nevares, whose family owned the original Suiza, is on our
Board of Directors.”
From 1995 through the year 2000, Engles, Beshears and Tracy Noll (the former controller
of the Southland dairy operations) pursued an aggressive growth strategy. Exhibit 2 shows
the rapid growth experienced by Suiza. Return on assets has ranged between 4.69% and
20.07%. Using a Dupont analysis, one can see that this has been achieved by the employment
of a relatively high but constant level of leverage (deﬁned as assets to equity). The assets to
equity ratio has ranged from a low of 3.46% in 1994 to 1998s high of 4.60%. Net income
divided by assets has exhibited higher variability.
As Beshears explains, “We sought to acquire businesses owned and run by the best people
in the industry. With our purchases of Swiss Dairy (9/96) and Model Dairy (12/96) people
in the industry really began to take notice of us. When we made these acquisitions we kept
existing ownership in place as management. You can bet that word spread across the industry
that bottling business owners could turn to Suiza if they sought to get more than simply the
net value of their assets out of the business.” Although not shown in Exhibit 2, Suiza’s sales
are forecast to be over $6 billion in 2000. That is a lot of growth from a company that did
not come into being until late 1993! Today Suiza Foods Corporation is an American
company with global aspirations. Its fast growth has not slowed.
Exhibit 3 shows Suiza Foods in its present structure as of January 1, 2000. As can be seen,
Suiza now consists of thirty different companies. This exhibit gives the names of Suiza’s
various divisions as well as the companies which make up these divisions. In addition to
these companies, most of which are important local brand names, Suiza also owns several
names with national, or nearly national, recognition. These names include Borden’s,
Meadow Gold, and Foremost (all of which came with the Southern Foods acquisition) and
International Delight, a brand acquired along with Morningstar in 1997. Regarding the
Borden name, Suiza owns the right to use this name for ﬂuid milk, while Dairy Farmers of
America owns the right to use this name for cheese.
4. Acquisition and marketing
Barbara was curious about the mechanics of a Suiza acquisition and so she sought out
Tracy Noll, Suiza’s Director of Development. Tracy originally grew up on a farm in
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1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
Total revenue $4,481,999 $3,320,940 $1,795,868 $1,207,565 $1,014,926 $891,165
Cost of sales $3,487,075 $2,557,908 $1,381,084 $970,796 $813,091 $710,175
Gross proﬁt $994,924 $763,032 $414,784 $236,769 $201,835 $180,990
Expenses & adjustments $885,193 $631,426 $386,020 $190,108 $195,584 $164,599
Net income (after taxes) $109,731 $131,606 $28,764 $46,661 $5,251 $16,391
Total assets (at year end) $2,658,922 $3,013,783 $1,403,462 $833,624 $484,852 $443,307
Shareholder equity (at year end) $583,972 $655,771 $359,310 $213,854 $111,909 $127,954
Net income/total assets (%) 4.13% 4.37% 2.05% 5.60% 1.08% 3.70%
Total assets/shareholder equity 4.55 4.60 3.91 3.90 4.33 3.46
Net income/shareholder equity (%) 18.79% 20.07% 8.00% 21.82% 4.69% 12.81%
Average common shares, diluted 42,858,492 41,965,564 31,348,591 24,491,899 20,935,161 22,761,925
Share price
Year ending 12/31/99 12/31/98 12/31/97 12/31/96 n.a. n.a.
Average $36.39 $52.00 $38.63 $17.00 n.a. n.a.
High $50.25 $67.00 $62.50 $20.75 n.a. n.a.
Low $29.63 $25.69 $19.25 $14.25 n.a. n.a.
* All dollar ﬁgures are in thousands, except for share prices.


















































































5Wisconsin. He ﬁrst entered the commercial agribusiness sector through the Master Mix
division of Central Soya. He then worked for the Southland Corporation, parent company of
7-Eleven Stores. Tracy held the position of Manager of Corporate Accounting, a position
which gave him a thorough understanding of a wide ranging empire which included 11,000
stores worldwide, an oil reﬁnery, an ice business, and 28 milk processing plants.
Noll explained the mechanics of a Suiza acquisition as follows. “Each owner has their own
motivation to sell. For one it may be estate planning needs. For another ownership may be
split up among several family members, some wanting to stay in business and others having
no active interest. Our basic program has been to pay a multiple of cash ﬂow, normally 5 to
7 times EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). Once we
acquire an operation in an area, then we seek other complimentary acquisitions which allow
us to realize economies in distribution and manufacturing from consolidation.”
To manage fast growth, Suiza’s upper management has had to make a succession of
important decisions on key personnel. To be sure these are the right decisions, one funda-
mental Suiza philosophy is to leave the local management team in place whenever possible.
As Tex Beshears, states, “local management knows the customers, the employees, and the
dairy farmers.”
Joining forces with Southern Foods brought top quality experienced managers into Suiza,
especially Pete Schenkel who was President of Southern Foods. Gregg considers the
appointment of Schenkel as President of the newly formed Suiza Dairy Foods Group to be
one the best decisions he has ever had to made. “When you make a management change at
that level it is very tough. However, within the day, I knew I had made the right decision,”
says Gregg.
Exhibit 3. Company organization chart, suiza foods corporation.
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From the proprietary bottling plant owner’s point of view, several external changes can
motivate a sale. On the sales side, the consolidation of grocery retailers and proliferation of
chain restaurants both contribute to reduce the number of available customers. Even though
the same amount of milk may be consumed, customer bargaining power increases. Some-
times even when a proprietary bottler wholesales milk at a competitive price, an account can
still be lost to an out-of-area bottler taking that business as part of a larger multiregional sales
relationship.
On the milk supply side, pressures also encouraged proprietary bottlers to sell. The advent
of the 1985 Food and Agricultural Adjustment Act brought about continued declining milk
prices, a whole herd buyout, and thus the liquidation of cow numbers in many areas. Price
volatility was the eventual result and in the late eighties a surplus of milk bottling capacity
made it very tough for bottlers to pass on frequent price increases to buyers. Although
today’s buyers are used to fast changing prices, in the late eighties a lot of equity was lost,
leaving surviving bottling plant owners cautious about future risks to their equity.
From Suiza’s perspective, when competing plants are acquired in a single area and
brought into coordinated management, important savings result. A study of ﬂuid bottlers by
Erba et al. (1997) illustrates why this is true. Regarding economies of plant size, each 1%
increase in processing plant capacity results in a 0.094% drop in bottling cost (p.37). Also
in regard to the plant, each 1% increase in plant size results in an 0.081% drop in bottling
cost (p. 37). Regarding economies from densiﬁcation in the delivery of milk, each 1%
reduction in route miles results in a 0.29% reduction in delivery costs (p. 59). Also regarding
deliveries, each 1% reduction in the number of delivery stops results in an 0.11% drop in
delivery cost (p. 59).
According to Noll, “Local management can best run the respective operations. For this
reason we have headquarters here in Dallas handle ﬁnancing, procurement, legal, banking
and insurance. However, the local operations handle sales, human resources, and operations.
Plus, we never force any operation to do it ‘the headquarters way.’ We have target-based
bonus compensation plans in each operation to further encourage local management to drive
for efﬁciency.”
4.2. Product development
At present ﬂuid milk products are considered relatively generic and are sold with little
fanfare or excitement. The cause for this is likely two fold. First, many consumers perceive
milk as a homogeneous, interchangeable product. Second, generic advertising, funded by
producers, reinforces this conception. The net result is that 67% of all retail milk is sold
under private label supermarket brands, creating a category with little excitement (Interna-
tional Dairy Foods Association, 1999).
“There is a real consumer barrier because most consumers see milk as being basically the
same,” Suiza Chief Marketing Ofﬁcer Mike Hogan says. “People don’t come to the milk
category expecting something new.” (Clark, p. 40) Hogan, a former Frito Lay marketing
executive, is leading Suiza’s effort to introduce new dairy products. Under his leadership
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kidsmilk. Exhibit 4 describes these products along with Dean’s new ﬂuid product called
Chugs. With Chugs, Dean’s is trying to develop a product aimed at the on-the-go consumer
whereas Suiza is seeking to develop new milk categories. Both efforts are critical to the long
term success of the ﬂuid milk industry.
4.3. Milk supply strategy
Fluid milk is generally a perishable product. In order to minimize returned product and
maximize quality, farm fresh milk is a crucial requirement. Furthermore, this supply must be
obtained in an economical fashion. In order to do this, some milk bottlers maintain ﬁeld staff,
producer payroll clerks, trucking ﬂeets, and manufacturing facilities. Such companies main-
tain very close relationships with their independent shippers (i.e., dairy farmers who do not
belong to a cooperative). Such companies may invest heavily in facilities capable of
processing surplus milk. This surplus is created when a company’s regular retail, school, and
food service customers do not need all the milk produced by farmers. This practice, called
balancing, can be very costly. An alternative to running a direct shipper system is to procure
milk from a full service cooperative.
Suiza has formed a joint venture with the Nation’s largest milk cooperative, Dairy Farmers
of America (DFA). Exhibit 3 shows that DFA owns 33.8% of the Suiza Foods’ Fluid Dairy
Group. DFA is headquartered in Kansas City and has a membership of over 25,000
dairymen. With a total milk supply of almost 40 billion pounds per year, Exhibit 5 shows that
DFA is more than three times larger than the number two cooperative in the nation, Land
O’Lakes. By itself, DFA accounts for 25% of the nation’s total milk supply.
Gary Hanman, DFA President, gives the following reasons for working closely with Suiza
Foods and other bottlers:
By owning the Borden cheese label and participating in 11 joint ventures with bottlers
including the nation’s largest, Suiza Foods, our members have greater market security and an
opportunity to capture income from the retail market. Joint ventures offer another protection
against losing control of our industry and becoming fully integrated like the hog and poultry
business (DFA Leader, January 2000, p. 1.).
Exhibit 4
New ﬂuid milk product concepts
Product name Maker Target market Product packaging Product test and ﬂavors
Fitmilk Suiza Athletes/diet
concious
114 oz., easy to poor,
plastic smart jug
Fat free with 67% more
calcium than regular milk
Kidsmilk Suiza Children 114 oz., easy to poor,
plastic smart jug
2% milkfat, 67% more
calcium, 50% more of 11
vitamins
Lifemilk Suiza Over 40 114 oz., easy to poor,
plastic smart jug.
1 % milkfat with 67%
more calcium
Chugs Dean’s Children & on the
go consumers
8 oz, pints, & quarts
plastic.
Chocolate milk, whole,
2% and nonfat milk.
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venture will be successful. From Suiza’s perspective, the cooperative provides the traditional
services such as milk supply balancing, transportation, quality control and milk producer
relations. Looking forward, Suiza is growing quickly and when acquiring new plants, it is
important that a secure milk supply be available. DFA, with its members located in 42 states,
is positioned to provide this supply. Finally, DFA provides capital to Suiza and this in turn
makes possible moves such as the Southern Foods merger.
The Suiza–DFA relationship reﬂects an understanding by dairy farmers that they must
take responsibility for marketing their own products. The venture is also viewed as a chance
to make money and a chance to obtain a secure home for raw milk. DFA does not play a
direct role in company management. In a sense, the relationship is an ordinary producer–
handler relationship. As Tex Beshears puts it, “they need to keep us competitive in terms of
raw milk cost.”
Exhibit 5








(Bil. Lbs.) (Bil. Lbs.) (Bil. Lbs.)
Mid America 17.2 DFA 31.5 DFA 39.7
AMPI 11.8 Land O’Lakes 12.2 Land O’Lakes 12.3
MMI 7.0 CMP 6.8 Calif. Dairies 11.7
CMP 6.5 Foremost 5.4 Northwest Dairy 5.4
Foremost Farms 5.6 Family Dairies 5.3 Dairylea 5.3
Farmer’s Union 5.4 Darigold 5.0 Family Diaries 5.2
Darigold 5.0 Dairylea 4.9 Foremost 5.2
Dairylea 4.5 AMPI 4.4 AMPI 3.7
Land O’Lakes 4.2 DCCA, 4.2 Manitowoc 3.7
DCCA 4.0 Manitowoc 3.5 Michigan Milk 3.0
* Sources: Koinski (1999), Mowery (1998), and Hoard’s (1997).
Exhibit 6
Suiza: Foods and Dairy Farmer of America each gain different things from their joint venture
Dairy Farmers of America gains because: Suiza Foods gains because:
Suiza eliminates the need to invest capital in
money-losing manufacturing plants. (A common
cooperative paradigm of the past.)
DFA provides traditional cooperative services such as
supply balancing, transportation, quality control, and
producer relations.
Suiza provides a guaranteed outlet for milk. DFA can quickly provide milk supply to new plants
and/or new locations.
Suiza provides a non-confrontational outlet for
milk.
DFA provides ﬁnancial capital.
Suiza offers a vertical integration opportunity
whereby proﬁts can be earned further up the
marketing chain.
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compared to the traditional role of a full-service milk cooperative. Historically such coop-
eratives would maintain costly balancing plants that manufactured butter, powder and/or
cheese. These price sensitive commodities could be proﬁtable in times of short milk supply
or in times when the plant they were made in could be used to withhold milk from a thirsty
market and thus result in processors paying raw milk premiums to the cooperative. However,
the reduced role of the government’s dairy price support program has made such generic
dairy products harder to sell due to increased price volatility. Also, strong-arm bargaining
tactics created adversarial relationships between cooperatives and their commercial milk
processors.
Today DFA’s relationship with Suiza provides a guaranteed outlet for milk and does so
in a nonconfrontational manner. This new view of milk marketing has allowed DFA to grow
without building milk plants. Also, it gives the cooperative a chance to earn proﬁts from
commercial sales. Many foresee future deregulation of the dairy industry. Should this result,
DFA’s joint venture with Suiza will provide a strong foothold in the commercial market.
5. Suiza today
Today Suiza Foods Corporation consists of the Fluid Group, Morningstar Foods, Suiza
Dairy in Puerto Rico, and Leche Celta in Spain. Suiza’s growth has required considerable
capital, including substantial debt. In order for Suiza’s strategy of acquisition and densiﬁ-
cation to succeed, sufﬁcient savings must occur. Further, Suiza must be able to develop a
national marketing presence in order to positively impact the demand for milk. Just as Suiza
begins its new marketing strategy with kidsmilk, ﬁtmilk and lifemilk, New England dairy
farmers are raising concerns about Suiza’s possible monopoly power in milk acquisition.
As Barbara reﬂected on all her interviews and the ﬂuid milk situation in general, she
recognized that ﬂuid milk processing plants were not being sold by their original owners
because those original owners were making too much money. The same could be said of
dairy farmers. In fact, Exhibit 7 shows that both the number of milk bottling plants and the
Exhibit 7
Number of U.S. ﬂuid milk bottling plants and number of U.S. dairy farms









* Source: USDA and California, various years.
** Source: U.S. census of agriculture, various years.
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structural change had causes far beyond any strategy pursued by Suiza. Thus, for Suiza’s
future success, a key question concerned whether an expansion strategy could succeed in
such an environment?
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